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Introduction: Lawyers and
Community Economic Development
William H. Simont
The Articles in this symposium and the experiences they report show
that, for lawyers, Community Economic Development (CED) has become
a more expansive and more complex subject than it was when we
discovered it two decades or so ago.
The Articles and the experiences are particularly revealing about what
I would guess have been the two central preoccupations of lawyers in the
field. The first, of course, is what we mean by community, and more
specifically, how a community can become-or be regarded as-a legal
and political actor. The second concerns lawyer accountability. Progressive
lawyers have long been preoccupied with accountability to their
disadvantaged clients-too much, I sometimes think-but the concern
seems particularly pressing where lawyers represent groups. CED is the
newest and in some respects most mysterious form of group representation.
I
COMMUNITY

These Articles suggest that the concept of community is becoming
more capacious and flexible. We have not solved the problem of defining
community, but we are becoming more comfortable with its ambiguity. I
take three points about the evolving conception of community from these
Articles.
First, community need not, as some of us once assumed, be defined
exclusively or even primarily in terms of residential proximity. Of course,
residential proximity remains a prominent link, as four of these Articles
show. The residents of West Harlem, West Oakland, Umoja Village, and
Inglewood have ties to each other and practical interests that arise in
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substantial part from residence.' But the national labor movement also
makes an appearance in all of these stories, and it is central to Sameer
Ashar's account of the Restaurant Opportunities Center in New York
City. 2
Here we find work as an alternative principle of affiliation-workers
forge community ties on the basis of common employment experiences,
often in the same industry.
On the other hand, while residence is not the sole focus of these
stories, one might say that localness is. As Scott Cummings points out,
labor organizing in the private sector in the last decade has tended to focus
on industries insulated from global competition, among them service
markets such as hotels and restaurants. Like housing and land
development, these industries are intensely local in both their economic
vision and their political practice.
Second, the fact that communities are made up of constituencies with
actual or potential conflicts of interest is no longer a dark secret, but a
fearlessly acknowledged reality.3 The tendency to talk about low-income
communities as if they were homogeneous and single-minded seems to be
a thing of the past. The advocates in these Articles recognize that they can
rarely commit themselves to communities without taking sides in intracommunity conflicts.
In Inglewood, California some residents expected job or shopping
benefits from Wal-Mart; others dreaded its exploitative labor policies and
its negative developmental externalities. In West Oakland, California,
Village West, Florida, and Central Brooklyn, New York, homeowners
looked forward to property appreciation from market-rate development and
saw little benefit from affordable housing while tenants feared
displacement and upscaling of commercial services. In these cases, our
participants squarely committed themselves to the more disadvantaged
constituency in the community.
That the University of California, Berkeley's East Bay Community
Law Center clinic changed the name of its program from "Community
Economic Development" to "Community Economic Justice" may be some
1. Sheila R. Foster and Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political Economy
of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1999 (2007) (West Harlem); Angela Harris, Margaretta
Lin, & Jeff Selbin, From "The Art of War" to "Being Peace":Mindfulness and Community Lawyering
in a Neo-Liberal Age, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2073 (2007) (West Oakland); Anthony V. Alfieri, Faith in
Community: Representing "Colored" Towns, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1829 (2007) (Umoja Village); Scott L.
Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement's Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site
Fight, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1927 (2007) (Ingelwood).
2. Sameer Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879
(2007).
3.
See William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty
Law Scholarship in the Post-Regan, Post-Modern Era, 48 U. OF MIAMI L. REV. 1099 (1994).
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kind of a milestone. One interpretation of the change is that it showed a
shift from a developmental perspective to a distributive one. But I do not
think that would be correct. Even as the Berkeley lawyers focused on the
interests of the most vulnerable members of the community, there was a
vision of development in their project. In purely distributive terms, their
clients at Wood Street might have done better by trading their places in the
neighborhood for benefits somewhere else-portable section 8 vouchers or
priority in affordable housing in some other neighborhood. But the thrust
of the advocacy effort seems to have reflected a vision of development
(albeit a reactive one)-a vision that saw mixed income use and
preservation of neighborhood ties as an important value. For me, the name
change acknowledges that there are likely to be multiple visions of
development in any community and that the project's commitments are not
necessarily to every sector of the community but to its subordinated ones.
Third, CED involves an increasingly complex interrelationship of
local and nonlocal ties. Recall that a major critique of CED has been that
political development at the local level has relatively low returns. The
"inside game" of community empowerment brings lower rewards than the
"outside game" of broad-based politics. Or so it was said by people like
David Rusk, and in some moods, Scott Cummings. 4 According to this
critique the community perspective ignores what Mark Granovetter calls
"the strength of weak ties."5 CED cultivates the strong ties of local
proximity, but arguably, weak ties-shallower but more numerous
connections to broader regional and national institutions-are critical for
political power.
My response to this critique has been that the inside game and the
outside game are not mutually exclusive; one can strengthen strong local
ties and forge links to broader-based institutions at the same time. I see the
descriptions of complex local- and super-local coalitions in these Articles
as a vindication of that answer. I also see that my answer was somewhat
simplistic in the light of the possibilities revealed in these accounts.
The early CED reacted to the urban policies of the 60s and 70s, which
neglected residential neighborhoods for the benefit of downtowns or
squeezed out their residents to promote development for incoming higherincome groups. There was a tendency to view the community as an enclave
against the outside world, trying to protect itself from expropriation.6
These Articles, however, show disadvantaged communities reaching out to
4.
DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN
AMERICA (1999);
Scott Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive
Politics: Toward a GrassrootsMovement forEconomic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 400 (2002).

5. Marc Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J.SOCIOLOGY 1360 (1973).
ECONOMIC
SIMON,
THE
COMMUNITY
6.
See,
e.g., WILLIAM H.
MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 69-112 (2002).
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ally themselves with broader-based groups. So in Inglewood, we find two
local groups, each purporting to speak for the community and each with a
genuine vision of community development, one allied with outside capital
and one allied with outside labor. Indeed, the role of labor in four of our
stories is especially striking. Community in these stories is not just the site
of broader-based struggles, but neither is it a self-contained enclave.
In this light, Sameer Ashar's suggestion that there is a global
dimension to CED is especially interesting and provocative. I still think
that localness remains a central defining characteristic of CED practice, but
I think Ashar has a point. He emphasizes the important ties that the
immigrant members of the Restaurant Opportunities Center have to other
countries where relevant social experiments are taking place. He also
points out that the ROC is situated in various global networks of activists
that exchange information and support.
However paradoxical, it may be true that localness and globalness are
both distinctive features of CED. Scott Cummings notes one way in which
globalization re-orients attention to the local: labor's tendency to focus on
non-tradeables, especially local service businesses. We can see that in other
industries such as high technology. Globalization leads simultaneously to
the cross-national diffusion of production (for example, outsourcing to
India) and to the cultivation of intensive local face-to-face collaborative
associations (for example, start-ups in Silicon Valley).
The connection between globalization and localization might be
this: Globalization means that weak ties can be formed with minimal
regard for distance. I can collaborate with someone in India as easily as
with someone in Florida. But distance remains a key factor with strong
ties. The kind of ties that depend on everyday face-to-face relations do
depend on proximity. So potential ties at the national or regional level have
no a priori advantage over potential ties at the global level. But local ties,
across a range of activity where everyday face-to-face relations are the
most productive or satisfying, do. It is hard for me to imagine what a fully
elaborated configuration of local-global associations around CED issues
would look like, but this is a theme worth thinking about.
II
ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability has always been a central theme in CED discussions
among lawyers and remains prominent in today's symposium. The
problem, of course, is inherent in collective representation. Lawyers are
supposed to be loyal to the interests of the client. Their presumption has
always been that the client is the best judge of her interests. There are
situations where this presumption does not work. Actually, I would argue,
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there are quite a few situations where it does not work, and not just with
minors and mentally disabled clients. But generally, with individual
clients, we at least know to whom we should be listening, and the inquiry
about interests is localized to a single person.
Collective representation is more difficult. Multiple individuals will
rarely have entirely convergent interests. The inquiry is simplified if they
have organized themselves in a way that gives them a unitary voice.
However, even with a single, well-structured organizational client, issues
of intra-client conflict can arise, as we see in the business corporation
context routinely.7 In the CED context, organizational client accountability
is often more complex. Sometimes the people we aspire to serve are not
organized, or are imperfectly organized. Sometimes we serve multiple
organizations or coalitions of organizations. These organizations rarely
embrace or coherently coordinate all the elements of the "community" to
which we feel committed.
So a distinctive feature of accountability in collective representation,
especially of disadvantaged people, is that the lawyer who wants to be
accountable has to create, or help create, a client capable of holding her
accountable. The more the organizational client is inclusive, democratic,
and effective at reconciling difference and coordinating action, the more
accountable the lawyer will be. Yet the extent to which the organization
has these qualities will be partly a function of the lawyer's own efforts.
This kind of accountability, the kind discussed in the Articles, might
be called Principal-Agent Accountability. The client is the principal; the
lawyer is the agent. The lawyer's job is to create or strengthen a Principal
capable of holding her accountable. Principal-Agent Accountability is
important, but it is not sufficient. The organizations we represent rarely
succeed in securing active participation by more than a small fraction of
the community. This is not to discredit to them; it just shows that
participation is a scarce good for most people. We can not do everything
for ourselves. We have to rely on other people to look out for our interests
and figure out what they are.
There is another kind of accountability that does not require an
effectively organized client. This second kind of accountability has yet to
figure very prominently in the CED literature. Consider it an alternative
form of accountability to Principal-Agent, one that fits the diffuse nature of
the publics that CED practitioners aspire to serve. We might call it Diffuse
Accountability. The main elements of this alternative form are transparent,
disciplined assessment of goals and measurement of performance. CED
groups and their lawyers should publicly commit themselves to goals that
7. See William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?: A
Taxonomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 57 (2003).
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are sufficiently specific to permit assessment as to how much progress they
have made. Of course, the goals may be reconsidered and re-specified in
the course of assessment. The point is not to fix the commitments in stone,
but to induce disciplined consideration and assessment.'
Sheila Foster's and Brian Glick's discussion of the response to
Columbia's expansion in West Harlem is an excellent example of how
such a process ought to start out-with a discussion of client goals and
strategic parameters and an indication of tentative strategy. An Article like
this, and the planning that it both records and helps clarify, contributes to
accountability. By making it clear what West Harlem Environmental
Action (WE ACT) was trying to accomplish, it makes it easier for the
public to both to contest the organization's goals, and to assess how
successful WE ACT is in achieving them. Although it is hard to imagine a
better account of an initial planning process than what they have provided,
the accountability I envision would require an even greater specification of
their goals along with benchmarks for success. Some of these measures
might be quantitative. For example, preventing secondary displacement,
one of their primary goals, should be susceptible to measurement. Others
might combine quantitative and qualitative dimensions, for example,
neighborhood satisfaction surveys.
The next stage in this accountability process involves assessment of
progress in terms of the initially stipulated goals. This is in part a process
of reconsideration and revision of goals. The initially articulated goals may
not seem right in the light of subsequent experience. Assessment provides
an opportunity to measure the efficacy of strategies and efforts. This latter
assessment has a comparative dimension. We can look to the achievements
of people with comparable goals and compare our progress with theirs. If
they are doing better, it could mean that they face better circumstances or
fewer obstacles. It could mean that we mis-specified our goals, and we are
not really trying to do the same thing. Or it could mean that they are
performing better, in which case we can may be able to improve our
strategies by seeing how they did it.
In order to engage in this process, we need both rich descriptions of
practice and concrete indicators of performance. These indicators might be
rough and informal. They might also be formal. There is no reason why
one could not rate, for example, community benefits agreements with the
same precision that Standard & Poor's rates bonds or Michelin rates
restaurants.
The last piece of the process I have in mind is peer review. Outsiders
with expertise in the same field could intensively scrutinize our practice
8. See id. at 167-93; on the multiple meanings of accountability, see R. W. Grant & Robert 0.
Keohane, Accountabilityand Abuses ofPower in World Politics,92 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 29 (2005).
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and give us structured feedback. The process would be non-adversarial but
not too intimate, either. It should be non-punitive and diagnostic, but
should not become a mutual admiration ritual.
Of course, we all recognize that our plans will never filly anticipate
the future; our metrics will crudely oversimplify the world; comparisons
will never control for all the relevant differences; and peer judgments may
be tainted by envy, bias, and ignorance. But these problems need not vitiate
the worth of the enterprise. The most important value of the enterprise is
not to generate some objective ranking of practices, but to induce the kind
of reflection and learning that comes when we challenge ourselves to be as
explicit as possible about what we are doing and to compare our efforts to
those of our peers.
We might borrow the term "mindfulness" to describe an important
dimension of this process. This mindfulness is closer to the orientation
prescribed by Pragmatism than the one prescribed by Buddhism. It is a
more collective and socially activist attitude than the Buddhist notion that
Harris, Lin, and Selbin invoke,9 but an equally valuable one. It entails a
disposition to subject our presuppositions to continuous reassessment and
reformulation in the light of experience.
This self-assessment, comparative benchmarking, and peer review is
attainable; it is increasingly common the business world and in
government.'" It is also making headway in the professions, especially
medicine, education, and social work. The legal profession remains an
outlier in the primitiveness of its mechanisms for assessing the quality of
its practice.
A major failing of the clinical movement is that it has not made much
contribution here. Clinical scholarship has made major contributions to
pedagogy and to our understanding of the psychology of professionalclient relations, but it has not done much to improve our capacity to assess
the efficacy of practice in terms of tangible goals. In my experience, peer
assessments of clinical programs rarely touch on practice in any detailed or
systematic manner. And clinical scholarship similarly fails to do so. Except
for Foster's and Glick's, none of the papers here describe the practices they
report in enough detail to permit much discussion of how effective the
practices were. I do not intend this as a criticism of the Articles themselves.
They do other things that are important. But I do intend it as a criticism of
the corpus of clinical scholarship that it contains so little analysis of this
kind.

9.
10.

See Harris et al., supra note 1.
See William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence:Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in

LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott eds. 2006).
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My thinking along these lines has been influenced by my Columbia
colleague Charles Sabel but I first encountered this notion of accountability
from Gary Bellow when I started working with him in 1979. The idea of
disciplined, quantified, self-assessment and peer review was a major
preoccupation of his in the latter part of his career. Most of the authors here
cite Bellow for his visionary thinking about combining legal advocacy with
political organizing." But evaluation and accountability were major
concerns of his as well. It is the aspect of his vision of legal services and
clinical education that has had the least impact on practice so far.
The reports in this symposium indicate a great deal of progress on
Principal-Agent accountability. CED practitioners have looked for
organizations capable of holding them accountable and have worked to
strengthen the organizations' capacity to do that. But we all know there are
limits to this kind of accountability, and in some practices, we may be
approaching the limits.
By contrast, the more diffuse mechanisms of accountability I discuss
here are relatively undeveloped. An organization that makes transparent its
goals and its progress enhances its accountability. If the materials are made
public-posted on the web, for example-the accountability is not to a
particular principal. It is to the world at large. That world, however,
contains myriad sub-constituencies. Some of them have an obvious stake in
the activities of any given program. Community members and funders, for
example, can take advantage of this kind of information. Peers in the
national and global networks to which Sameer Ashar refers can benefit.
And these constituencies will react to the information in ways that may
generate both "hard" and "soft" feedback. No doubt rivals and opponents
will also be interested in our efforts and will sometimes make opportunistic
use of them. But any meaningful form of accountability has risks.
It may be surprising that we have seen more success on PrincipalAgent accountability than on diffuse accountability. Diffuse accountability
would seem to be the easier project; it does not require political
transformation or ground-up institution building. The Articles show that
we have made enormous progress on the really hard task; we should not
forget about the relatively easy one.

11.
Alfieri, supra note 1, at 1864 n.159; Ashar, supra note 2, at 1919 n.149; Foster & Glick,
supra note 1, at 2057 n.207; Harris et al., supra note 1, at 2097 n. 113.

